

## THE RHETORIC OF PEDAGOGICAL NARCISSISM: PHILOSOPHY, *PHILOTIMIA* AND SELF-DISPLAY IN MAXIMUS OF TYRE'S FIRST ORATION

### I

Maximus of Tyre's first<sup>1</sup> oration is often regarded as an important source for the reconstruction of the author's view of his own rhetorical<sup>2</sup> and philosophical project and, in consequence, for the interpretation of the whole corpus of the 40 subsequent *dialexeis* which Maximus probably delivered after this introductory speech.<sup>3</sup> The fact that in this oration, more clearly than anywhere else in Maximus' *œuvre*, the addressees of the speech can be characterized as young Roman students of philosophy,<sup>4</sup> makes this text outstanding material for further examination by those who want to gain a better understanding of Maximus' pedagogical aims, conceptions and techniques. In this respect, three scholars certainly deserve mention here. Hobein<sup>5</sup> was the first to analyse Maximus' first oration systematically, shedding light on the circumstances in which he performed the text. Koniaris,<sup>6</sup> on the other hand, although offering many interesting observations, probably went too far in his interpretation of the first oration as Maximus' general self-apology for his adoption of 'philosophical

<sup>1</sup> In the manuscript tradition, this oration is the seventh of the series, but there are very good indications to assume that it must have been the first. H. Mutschman, 'Das erste Auftreten des Maximus von Tyrus in Rom', *Sokrates* 71 (1917), 185–97 and J. Puiggali, *Etude sur les Dialexeis de Maxime de Tyr, conferencier platonicien du III<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Lille, 1983), at 18–21, who are ardent defenders of the traditional order, incorrectly reacted against the modified order proposed by H. Hobein, *Maximi Tyrii philosophoumena* (Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana) (Leipzig, 1910), and later convincingly defended by G.L. Koniaris, 'On Maximus of Tyre: Zetemata (I)', *ClAnt* 1 (1982), 87–121, at 88–102. This latter order seems to be accepted now by *communis opinio* of the editors of Maximus' text. Cf. M.B. Trapp (ed.), *Maximus Tyrius, Dissertationes* (Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana) (Stuttgart and Leipzig, 1994); G.L. Koniaris (ed.), *Maximus Tyrius, Philosophoumena – ΔΙΑΛΕΞΕΙΣ* (Texte und Kommentare) (Berlin and New York, 1995); and the recent Spanish translation in J.L. López Cruces (and J. Campos Daroca), *Máximo de Tiro, Disertaciones filosóficas. Introducción general, introducciones, traducción y notas* (Biblioteca clásica Gredos) (Madrid, 2005), 2 vols.

<sup>2</sup> There can be no doubt about Maximus' rhetorical aspirations, even though he himself stresses his philosophical pose. For the influence of (contemporary) rhetoric on the argumentation in Maximus' first oration, see M. Szarmach, *Maximos von Tyros. Eine literarische Monographie* (Torun, 1985), at 21–4.

<sup>3</sup> See e.g. M.B. Trapp, 'Philosophical sermons: the "Dialexeis" of Maximus of Tyre', in *ANRW* 2.34.3 (1997), 1945–76, at 1951: 'The authoritative posture thus assumed in Dialexis 1 is maintained in the discourses that follow: in the confident and knowledgeable tones in which doctrines are expounded; in the scornful vigour with which the past and present misdeeds of non-philosophical mankind are castigated; and in the rhetorical virtuosity with which both doctrinal learning and moralising comment are presented.'

<sup>4</sup> The certainty of this supposition will be nuanced below, but this hypothesis can still be considered instructive for our analysis. Cf. *infra*, nn. 47 and 48.

<sup>5</sup> H. Hobein, 'Zweck und Bedeutung der ersten Rede des Maximus Tyrius', in F. Leo (ed.), *Xáπτες: Friedrich Leo zum sechzigsten Geburtstag dargebracht* (Berlin, 1911), 188–219.

<sup>6</sup> G.L. Koniaris, 'On Maximus of Tyre: Zetemata (II)', *ClAnt* 2 (1983), 212–50 (including a translation of the first oration).

personae' in his other *dialexeis*. Trapp,<sup>7</sup> contesting Koniaris' interpretation, rightly labelled Maximus' first oration as a *λόγος προτρεπτικός* by which the author 'seeks to persuade the audience both that they need philosophical instruction, and that he is the man to provide it' (p. 4). It goes without saying that, in a society where there was no compulsory school attendance and education was generally 'privatized',<sup>8</sup> teachers had to promote themselves in such a way that both the student's intellectual needs and the solution for them (the teacher himself) are compellingly stressed.<sup>9</sup>

In adding to these previous studies, this paper has a double aim. On the one hand, it wants to pay closer attention to the gradual argumentative development of Maximus' speech. On the other, it wants to frame this text more profoundly within the performative and didactic context for which it was designed. In other words, I will try to deepen our understanding of this central text in Maximus' *œuvre* by combining a close textual analysis with a pragmatic approach, in which some pedagogical notions will be integrated. By this method, I hope to demonstrate how Maximus intelligently reconciles an extrovert form of self-display, which links him to the contemporary 'sophistic' climate, with the display of a search for authentic sincerity, which would bring him closer to the great names of the Greek philosophical tradition. In order to adequately assess the effect of this speech on the audience, I prefer to offer a linear reading of the text, since this is the method best calculated to highlight Maximus' shifting techniques and the gradual process of persuasion. A non-linear analysis risks being blind to those *tours de force* which characterize Maximus' balancing between rhetoric and philosophy *vis-à-vis* his listeners.<sup>10</sup>

Throughout my analysis, Maximus will be characterized as a narcissistic type of teacher. As appears very clearly from a paper by Amirault<sup>11</sup> about the relation between good teachers and good students, this narcissistic teaching is nowadays often seen as an approach which should be avoided rather than pursued. Amirault tells an anecdote about her best student who one day declared her ambition to become a

<sup>7</sup> M.B. Trapp, *Maximus of Tyre: The Philosophical Orations* (Oxford, 1997), at 3–15 (including a translation of the first oration).

<sup>8</sup> See H.-I. Marrou, *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'Antiquité. 1. Le monde grec* (Paris, 1981), e.g. at 175, in which is suggested that there was only very little correspondence between the Greek pedagogical system and our modern idea of 'obligation scolaire'. See also M.L. Clarke, *Higher Education in the Ancient World* (London, 1971), at 7–8; T. Morgan, *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds* (Cambridge, 1998), at 82: 'Teachers can be assumed to have felt some of the same effects of competition. The absence of a curriculum would give teachers freedom but also heavy responsibility ...'

<sup>9</sup> In recent times, some good revisions of Marrou's (see n. 8) 'apolitical' approach of ancient education are assembled in Y.L. Too (ed.), *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity* (Leiden, Boston and Köln, 2001). Of course, even the act of teaching implies certain rhetorical manipulations of the teacher, who tries to gain authority for himself. See also R.A. Kaster, 'The grammarian's authority', *CPh* 75 (1980), 216–41 for a good example of this pedagogical rhetoric in Servius' commentary on Virgil.

<sup>10</sup> A good example of the latter way of reading this *dialexis* can be found in J. Campos Daroca and J.L. López Cruces, 'Maxime de Tyr et la voix du philosophe', *Philosophie Antique* 6 (2006), 81–105, at 98, n. 55: 'Dans cette conférence, il [=Maxime] construit un mouvement qui va de la diversité à l'unité. Si en première lieu il compare la diversité des circonstances de la vie aux eaux d'un fleuve (§ 2), à la fin l'emphase retombe sur l'unité qui prévaut sur la diversité apparente: les apparences diverses des acteurs sur scène ne cachent pas la beauté du drame, qui est "une seule et la même" (§ 10).' Although this interpretation is far from pointless, a lot of comment on the oration's ingenuous rhetorical composition and argumentation remains unsaid.

<sup>11</sup> C. Amirault, 'The good teacher, the good student. Identifications of a student teacher', in J. Gallop (ed.), *Pedagogy: The Question of Impersonation* (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1995), 64–78.

university teacher herself. Amirault's uneasy reaction to this statement suggests a modern aversion to this didactic side-effect, which is however quite hard to exclude from the very system of pedagogy: 'As the "object of all his care and attention", the "gifted pupil" embodies the teacher's narcissistic desire for reproduction, and at the same time confirms the institutional pedagogy within which both are constructed' (p. 71). Elsewhere in her article, furthermore, she argues: 'This same irony haunts most writing about pedagogy, the rhetoric of which so often seems to contradict its theoretical implications' (p. 77). Maximus, on the contrary, seems entirely unperturbed by the implications of a narcissistic kind of teaching for his students. Given his social context of the so-called 'Second Sophistic', in which *paideia* was a decisive criterion for separating the elite from the common man,<sup>12</sup> education as provided by teachers like Maximus especially needed to be organized so as to create multiple intellectual 'copies' of the educated instructor. This latter aspect forms the core element of Maximus' introductory speech. As will be argued later on in this contribution, it is the very dynamic force of Maximus' narcissism that will supply him with the rhetorical strength that he needs in order to convince his pupils that he is in fact the teacher *par excellence* who will guide them towards a successful and philosophically inspired life and career.

One preliminary point still needs to be made. Since this speech was delivered in the context of a public performance, the contact between the speaker and the audience is very close and intense. As is often the case, from the classical orators on to Maximus' contemporaries of the Second Sophistic, the confident rhetorician establishes a rapport with his listeners and offers his own person as guarantee of the content of his words. This situation can both strengthen and weaken the speaker's hand, and also puts his person and education at stake, in a way that might render him as well as his speech quite vulnerable.<sup>13</sup> The very context of the *dialexeis* thus urges Maximus to combine a convincing self-presentation with a persuasive discourse. Unfortunately, we cannot physically experience any more what it was like to listen to, watch, and evaluate Maximus' performance, but certain textual elements enable us to make some plausible assumptions about how Maximus stood there lecturing in front of his audience. These elements, both the imagery<sup>14</sup> and some explicit sayings,<sup>15</sup> suggest that Maximus was very well aware of his own performative situation and that he made

<sup>12</sup> On the social value of Greek *paideia*, see e.g. B.E. Borg (ed.), *Paideia: The World of the Second Sophistic* (Berlin and New York, 2004). Cf. also T.S. Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht. Zur sozialen und politischen Funktion der zweiten Sophistik in der griechischen Welt der Kaiserzeit* (München, 1997); T. Whitmarsh, *Greek Literature and the Roman Empire: The Politics of Imitation* (Oxford, 2001); and id., *The Second Sophistic* (Oxford, 2005).

<sup>13</sup> Cf. the interrelation of culture and official occasions in P. Bourdieu, *La distinction: critique social du jugement* (Paris, 1979), at 451–2: 'La "culture" ... est une des composantes fondamentales de ce qui fait l'homme accompli dans sa définition dominante, en sorte que la privation est perçue comme mutilation essentielle, qui atteint la personne dans son identité et sa dignité d'homme, condamnant au silence dans toutes les situations officielles, où il faut "paraître en public", se montrer devant les autres, avec son corps, ses manières, son langage.' On Maximus' specific cultural climate, in which rhetoric was of major importance, see M.B. Trapp, *Philosophy in the Roman Empire. Ethics, Politics and Society* (Aldershot, 2007), at 235: 'Rhetorical education directed attention to the external surface of the physical self, what others perceived of one visually and aurally, and to the self as public performance.'

<sup>14</sup> See below for a more systematic analysis of these images, among which are athletics, drama and music.

<sup>15</sup> In paragraph 6 of the first oration, Maximus speaks of himself as wanting to be challenged ἐπὶ ταυτησί τῆς ἔδρας, which suggest an institutional space where he can perform as a rhetorician. See below for the discussion of other textual elements.

serious attempts to prove himself a performer as well by critically defining his own discourse among other practices of (rhetorical) performance.

## II

In the opening section of the first *dialexis* (§ 1–3), Maximus draws a comparison between drama, music and philosophy.<sup>16</sup> The comparison can be schematized as follows:

Author	Play	Actor
X (Composer)	Music (modes)	<b>Musician</b>
God	Life	<b>Philosopher</b>

Koniaris also detected this schema, but, driven as he was by his desire to explain Maximus' philosophical 'impersonations' in his other *dialexeis* by means of this so-called 'programmatic' passage, he one-sidedly concluded that the actor and the musician, who are able to vary their tone in different circumstances, are being held up as exemplary to the philosopher.<sup>17</sup> The philosopher's task, according to Koniaris's interpretation of Maximus' text, thus consists in the enactment of different philosophical *personae*, each adapted to the various situations which the philosopher/actor has to face.

My belief is that this passage should be read differently. To my mind, Koniaris pays too little attention to the polemical tone which Maximus adopts in the opening section. This tone appears already very clearly from the provocative question *Τί δή ποτε*;<sup>18</sup> at the very beginning of the speech as well as from the asseveration *μὰ Δία* two sentences further in the text, which both point to the speaker's indignation at the fact that versatility is to many people a questionable attitude for a philosopher, while artists like an actor or a musician get away with it. Therefore, the entire first paragraph should be read as an argument *a fortiori*: if even actors and musicians are felt to be behaving entirely appropriately in relying on their *πολυφωνία*, then the philosopher, whose domain is capricious life itself, designed by God and lived by every human, should be the one par excellence to display versatility, both in his own and in humanity's interest.<sup>19</sup> After all, philosophy is the institution which brings happiness to its practitioners, whereas

... ὥδῃς μὲν καὶ τῆς ἐκ μελῶν ψυχαγωγίας ὀλίγη τοῖς ἀνθρώποις χρεῖα ... (Max. Or. 1.2)

... men's need of songs and tunes and the entertainment deriving from them is limited.

(Tr. M.B. Trapp)

Given philosophy's prevalence over theatre and music in Maximus' thoughts, it is very unlikely that he takes the actor as an example for his own philosophical performance. Instead, he wants to stress his own multilayered talents, which enable him to speak

<sup>16</sup> Cf. M. Kokolakis, *The Dramatic Simile of Life* (Athens, 1960), at 48–50 and Campos Daroca and López Cruces, 'Maxime de Tyr' (n. 10), at 95–6.

<sup>17</sup> Koniaris, 'Zetemata (II)' (n. 6), at 212–43.

<sup>18</sup> J.D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles* (Oxford, 1954<sup>2</sup>) does not mention the particle *δή ποτε*, but in LSJ the word combination *τί δή ποτε*; is translated by 'what in the world?', an expression which indicates some emotional involvement of the speaker with his sayings.

<sup>19</sup> Puiggali, *Etude* (n. 1), at 52–3 and Campos Daroca and López Cruces, 'Maxime de Tyr' (n. 10), put a lot of stress on the concept of *πολυφωνία*, which is, according to them, a key concept in this oration.

and act properly in each situation, and which he ascribes to his general devotion to philosophy.

It becomes thus understandable why, to paraphrase Maximus in the second paragraph, the philosopher is the man who follows the other, manlier<sup>20</sup> muse, whom Homer called Calliope,<sup>21</sup> Pythagoras Philosophy. In the rest of the paragraph as well as in the third, Maximus by means of a range of different images continues to stress the variety of life, which urges a philosopher not to restrict his discourse to one single λόγος.<sup>22</sup> This imagery itself forms already an indication of Maximus' double inclination both to rhetoric and to philosophy. Whereas the actor and the musician (and, later on in the text, also the athlete) provoke the association with the performative climate of the Second Sophistic, the other comparisons, especially with the shepherd and the doctor, point to Maximus' pedagogical and philosophical task, which involves guiding and remediating his audience (here likened to the shepherd's flock and to the doctor's patients).

In any case, the message Maximus wants to communicate to his public can be easily understood: philosophy is about all aspects of life, and, by consequence, the philosopher, the 'actor' of the real world, is no outsider to the world which surrounds him, but is acquainted with and possesses superior knowledge of each single facet of life itself, thanks to his general philosophical λόγος.

This, however, is neither an innocent description of what philosophy is<sup>23</sup> nor the simple articulation of the philosopher's task.<sup>24</sup> Maximus' public will almost certainly have interpreted these statements against the background of the more technical and 'professional' philosophical schools of Maximus' time, where the teachers to some extent tended to contrast themselves to everyday experiences.<sup>25</sup> Maximus, so much

<sup>20</sup> On the rhetorical dynamics of masculinity (as a norm), see e.g. Whitmarsh, *The Second Sophistic* (n. 12), at 32–7 and 52–4.

<sup>21</sup> For a thorough discussion of this passage, see Campos Daroca and López Cruces, 'Maxime de Tyr' (n. 10), at 99–100.

<sup>22</sup> In contrast to Koniaris and Trapp, I prefer to leave the term λόγος untranslated, for the very ambiguity of the word, which can mean both speech (with a rhetorical undertone) and reasoning (with a philosophical undertone), is already an indication of the fact that Maximus is rhetorically aiming at fusing these two domains into one another in order to transfer his authority mutually. This latter aspect will appear more clearly during my subsequent analysis.

<sup>23</sup> This is, besides, not the only place in Maximus' *œuvre* where the author provides elements of his definition of philosophy. For the meaning of philosophy in Maximus' *dialexeis*, and especially in orations 4 and 29, see M. Szarmach, 'Über Begriff und Bedeutung der "Philosophia" bei Maximus Tyrios', in P. Oliva and A. Proliková (edd.), *Concilium Eirene XVI. Proceedings of the 16th International Eirene Conference, Prague 31.8 – 4.9.1982* (Prague, 1983), vol. 1, 223–6.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. G. Anderson, 'The Second Sophistic: some problems of perspective', in D.A. Russell (ed.), *Antonine Literature* (Oxford, 1990), 91–110, at 107: 'It is clear enough that Maximus is forcing philosophy into a sophistic mould, however we choose to describe the latter. The result, as so often in sophistic literature, is the manipulation of motifs and topoi in ever more surprising combinations. When "sophistic" takes possession of any given genre, the result is a distinctive texture which is something more than mere rhetorical elaboration.' Cf. also Trapp, *Philosophy in the Roman Empire* (n. 13), at 25: '... Dio and Maximus ... have a tendency to play arch games with the name *philosophos*, treating it as something they wish to manoeuvre their audiences into applying to them, rather than forthrightly seizing it themselves ...'

<sup>25</sup> A good canonical example of this outsider position of the philosopher (in opposition to rhetoricians) can be found in Pl. *Th.* 172C–177B. One should also give oneself account of the fact that even the more 'theoretical' philosophers still want to help people lead better lives. The dispute between them and Maximus is over how much (or how little) technicality in logic and metaphysics is needed in order to realize the benefits of *philosophia* and live a good life. Cf. Trapp, *Philosophy in the Roman Empire* (n. 13), at 49–61. For another illustration of the idea that a philosopher (qua ruler) is never off duty, see Plut. *An. seni* 796D–E.

may be clear, immediately highlights another aspect of philosophy. His philosopher also has the task of guiding people's ordinary existence, in order to guard them from taking the immoral, dark, barbaric<sup>26</sup> roads of life. He thereby creates for his ideal philosopher a tremendous authority:<sup>27</sup>

Παραπλήσιον γάρ μοι δοκεῖ δρᾶν ὅστις οὐκ ἀξιοῖ τὸν φιλόσοφον μηδένα παριέναι καιρὸν λόγου, οἷον εἴ τις καὶ ἀνδρὶ δεινῷ τὰ πολέμια, ἀγαθῷ μὲν ὀπλιτεύειν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ ἐκηβολεῖν καὶ ἐφ' ἵππου καὶ ξὺν ἄρματι, ἀποκρίναι καιρὸν ἓνα ἐξελόμενος τῆς ὅλης τοῦ πολέμου χρείας καὶ τύχης, πράγματος οὐχ ἐστῶτος οὐδ' ὁμολογησαμένου. (Max. Or. 1.3)

Whoever refuses to allow the philosopher to seize every opportunity to speak seems to me to be doing the same as someone who selects a single station from the whole chancy, fluctuating, unstable business of war, and there confines the versatile soldier who knows how to fight both as hoplite and as archer, and can shoot as effectively on horseback as he can from a chariot.

(Tr. M.B. Trapp)

This strong comparison leaves no doubt that, to Maximus' mind, the philosopher is needed in society because of his manifold skills, due to his general philosophical λόγος.<sup>28</sup>

In the next part of the speech (§ 4–5), Maximus smoothly changes the subject of his discourse towards a more competitive point of view, thus adapting his philosophical theme to the social environment of his public, that – *noblesse oblige* – must have been thoroughly acquainted with political quarrels, law courts, rhetorical competitions and other means of displaying social power. Again, Maximus uses a well-chosen image, this time that of an athlete, whose ambitious soul mirrors the φιλοτιμία of Maximus' audience.

In the fourth paragraph, Maximus highlights the huge importance of participating in every competition, not only for the athlete, who can win multiple prizes at different games, but also – and especially – for the φιλοσοφούντες, who strive for a virtuous soul, the value of which outnumbers any prize that can be won at a physical competition. This is illustrated by the fact that, whereas everyone likes to watch sports competitions, but no spectator wants to stand in the arena himself, yet every observer

<sup>26</sup> The use of this word in the context of the *dialexis* gets a normative undertone here, since Maximus capitalizes on his audience's will to become Greek through cultural refinement, which they search to attain by attending Maximus' orations. Cf. R. Preston, 'Roman questions, Greek answers: Plutarch and the construction of identity', in S. Goldhill (ed.), *Being Greek under Rome. Cultural Identity, the Second Sophistic and the Development of Empire* (Cambridge, 2001), 86–119, at 87: 'Greek culture, or *paideia*, is crucial to our understanding of elite constructions of their identity, of the activities of the poleis, and of the development of responses to the impact of Roman rule.' Within this communicational context, 'barbaric' can be regarded as 'bad' and 'better to avoid', whereas 'Greek' sets the norm, as is also the case in a couple of passages in this *dialexis* (§§ 4, 6 and 10; see Trapp, *Maximus of Tyre* [n. 7], at 8, n. 18).

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Trapp, *Philosophy in the Roman Empire* (n. 13), at 13: '... *philosophia* and its exponents claimed unique and exclusive access to final truth about humanity, life, reality, the divine and the universe.' Cf. also *ibid.* at 22–3.

<sup>28</sup> It may be interesting to confront Maximus' affirmations with the complaints of some modern theorists about their problematic position towards the society they reflect on. Roland Barthes can function as a good representative here. In the afterword to his *Mythologies* (Paris, 1957), at 267, he deplores that the *mythologue*, whose goal it is to observe and to defile the naturalization of myths on which societies are built (and whose intellectual pose is very similar to that of the ancient Greek philosophers), quasi-necessarily occupies a position outside the community he wants to talk about. Maximus, on the other hand, by redefining the very function and concept of philosophy, rhetorically aims at being both a philosopher and yet an insider to the world of his public.



of great spirit would be willing to 'abandon his role as spectator and become a competitor instead' (*ἀποθέμενος τὸν θεατὴν ἀγωνιστῆς γενέσθαι* – tr. M.B. Trapp). In the next paragraph, Maximus explains why: since athletic success depends on a natural endowment that not many people have, whereas almost everyone has the moral endowment needed for the cultivation of virtue,<sup>29</sup> people are much more likely to succeed in the pursuit of moral virtue than in the pursuit of athletic success. Hope and love, two faculties which are given by God to every human being, guide people's conduct, but only those who, supported by philosophical insight, fix their ambitions on a stably realizable and truly satisfying goal will enjoy a stable, victorious and successful life.

After having proved the dominance of philosophy over drama in the first section of the speech, Maximus here talks down the attractions of another cornerstone of the Greco-Roman society, that is athletics.<sup>30</sup> Just as before, philosophy turns out to be the better road to success, but we can detect a slight shift towards Maximus' real interest, which will be thoroughly explored in the following section of the oration: the reconciliation of rhetorical competitiveness and philosophical authenticity.

In this next section (§ 6–7a), Maximus makes a crucial rhetorical move, bringing his own personality into play, combined with his narcissistic pedagogical approach. Taking up the image of the athlete again, but this time as a counterpoint, Maximus provokes his audience to refrain from idle praise for his oratory, and to react actively to his speeches instead, by confidently taking the floor and by competing with 'the master' for honour's sake:

*Εἰ γάρ, ὦ θεοί, ἐμῶν θεατῶν γένοιτό τις συναγωνιστῆς ἐμοί, ἐπὶ ταυτησὶ τῆς ἔδρας συγκονιόμενος καὶ συμπονῶν, ἐγὼ τότε εὐδοκιμῶ, στεφανοῦμαι τότε, κηρύττομαι τὸτ' ἐν τοῖς Πανέλλησιν· ἕως δὲ νῦν ἀστεφάνωτος εἶναι ὁμολογῶ καὶ ἀκήρυκτος, κἂν ὑμεῖς βοᾷτε. Τί γάρ ἐμοὶ ὄφελος τῶν πολλῶν λόγων καὶ τῆς συνεχοῦς ταύτης ἀγωνίας; Ἐπαινοὶ; Ἄλις τούτων ἔχω. Δόξα; Διακορῆς εἰμι τοῦ χρήματος.* (Max. Or. 1.6)

I wish to heaven some fellow competitor might emerge from my audience, to share with me the dust and the exertions of this platform! Then will I win the glory of a victor's wreath; then alone will my name resound in triumph at the Panhellenic games! Until now, I confess, I have remained uncrowned and unproclaimed – shout though you may! What good to me are the many speeches I have made, the continual struggle in which I have engaged? Praise? I have enjoyed enough of that! I have my fine reputation, and am sated with it! (Tr. M.B. Trapp)

Maximus here beautifully makes use of an audacious 'sophistic' kind of argumentation. On the literal level, he presents himself as a sincere philosophical teacher, inciting his audience to participate in his philosophical courses for their own and for the teacher's sake, but, at the same time, he also highlights his own philosophical value by referring to the praise he already received from other audiences in the past. On top of that, is the fact that his present listeners remain silent as well – and we can only

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Koniaris, 'Zetemata (II)' (n. 6), at 227: 'Clearly, the passage exudes ethical optimism.' This attitude must, of course, be understood as a protreptic speech act: Maximus wants his audience to know that he can almost certainly guarantee them that they will benefit from his courses, by which their souls will be elevated. Maximus can in fact declare this because he is speaking in front of people of equal social standard. Towards the lower classes, *paideia* was used as a means of naturalizing the unnatural intellectual differentiation between the 'high' society and the 'low' society. Cf. above, n. 12.

<sup>30</sup> For another ancient parallel which also downplays the value of athletic competitions in favour of mental development, see Ath. 10. 413C–414C, with comments on and citations from Eur. *Autochus* and Xenoph. fr. 2.

assume they did – an implicit affirmation of the authority which he already claims to be his (cf. *κἄν ὑμεῖς βοᾶτε*).

In this section we can explicitly detect a strong connection of the concept of philosophy – an important aspect of Greek *paideia* – to the oral battles which were very popular in the culture of the so-called Second Sophistic. The link between the two, then, does not seem artificial in the light of Maximus' previous utterances about philosophy: since philosophy is the ruling protean component of life's regulation, rhetoric is one of its domains as well! Maximus' definition of philosophy empowers him to act as a boastful orator – a pose which reminds us of the sophists described in Philostratus' *Vitae Sophistarum* – without, however, losing his philosophical credibility.

Another concept which Maximus introduces in the passage cited above is imitation, *μίμησις*. This topic is further elaborated in the seventh paragraph of the *dialexis*, where emulative imitation is declared to be unquestionably preferable to the simple pleasure of listening. Maximus compares the role of a teacher to that of a flautist who taught birds to sing a tuneful song by demonstrating it on his flute. In just the same way, Maximus' students need to echo the master's knowledge by carefully imitating his speech and being, an educational paradigm which seems to be closer to 'rhetorical' than to 'philosophical' practices.<sup>31</sup> Here we – and the audience as well – gain a very close look into Maximus' self-centred, narcissistic concept of teaching, which also directly involves Maximus' own (self-constructed) personality. This pedagogical narcissism, linked to his imitational teaching model, puts Maximus' self at stake and is the speaker's excuse to praise himself without risking the public's annoyed disapproval:

Ἄνθρωποι δὲ ὄντες οὐδὲ κατὰ ὄρνιθας ξυνάσσονται ἡμῖν, ἀκούοντες θαμὰ οὐκ ἀσῆμων αὐλημάτων, ἀλλὰ νοερῶν λόγων καὶ διηρθρωμένων καὶ γονίμων καὶ πρὸς μίμησιν εὖ πεφυκότων; Ὡστε ἔγωγε, τέως καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας ὑπὲρ τῶν ἡμετέρων σιγὴν ἔχων καὶ μηδὲν σεμνὸν μηδὲ ὑπέραυχον μήτε ἰδιᾷ μήτε εἰς κοινὸν εἰπὼν, νῦν μοι δοκῶ ὑμῶν εἵνεκεν γαυρότατα ἂν καὶ μεγαλαυχότατα εἰπεῖν. (Max. Or. 1.7)

My audience are men, not birds; what they listen to over and over again is not inarticulate piping but rationally articulated speech which appeals to the intellect, stimulates its hearers, and is made for imitation. Will they answer my song? It is this question that induces me to break the silence I have so far maintained to all about my own merits. I have hitherto said nothing conceited or boastful either in public or in private, but for your sake I am now resolved to speak with all the pride and vanity at my command. (Tr. M.B. Trapp)

According to Maximus' argumentation, the whole context in which this oration takes place provides the philosophical orator with the *καιρός* to abandon his natural modesty and to praise himself as an extraordinary performer, just as the situation of the monological lecture demands. The lecturer, after all, is a 'subject-presumed-to-know', who must stay true to the 'rituals' of the lecture which require an authori-

<sup>31</sup> Whereas Maximus offers this imitational and off-hand method to become a good philosopher, other philosophers of his age, like Plutarch and Epictetus, lay stress on the hard and continual work which must be invested to start off on the difficult road to self-improvement. From their point of view, Maximus would be seen as offering a distinctly 'soft' option (like the short road to rhetorical success offered by the ingratiating sophist of Lucian's *Rhetorum Praeceptor*). More clearly than the aforementioned philosophers, Maximus seems to care about not scaring off his public, as he presents a philosophical course in correspondence with the rhetorical education to which his pupils are already accustomed. Yet again, Maximus tries his best to picture himself as a gentle insider to the world of his public.



tarian pose of the speaker.<sup>32</sup> And, of course, since the protean philosopher is familiar with every aspect of life, he will appropriately deal with this performative situation as well. In this *dialexis*, as well as in his other orations, Maximus will thus be able to treat philosophy in a rhetorical way, because that is exactly what the context of lecturing urges him to do, and what makes him a credible speaker.<sup>33</sup>

Without any boundaries left now, Maximus can freely advertise his rhetorical style, which will also be useful for the education of those who want to become a rhetorician, a poet or a politician.<sup>34</sup> Here we encounter the rhetorical and seductive power of Maximus' narcissistic pedagogy, for not only does this narcissism reflect the ideal of the perfectly imitating pupil; it also facilitates the pupils' identification with the wealthy, gifted speaker. They see a rhetorical multitalented virtuoso at work in front of them, who embodies – within his philosophical framework – every achievement they strive for in their elitist society.<sup>35</sup> Maximus' pedagogical narcissism not only generates the image of the ideal student, it also makes the speaker himself the perfect example, and, by consequence, the perfect teacher.

In the next section of the *dialexis* (§ 7b–8), Maximus, before falling prey to disproportionate and therefore suspicious inclinations to boastful rhetoric, returns to the most important knowledge he claims to teach, namely philosophy. He re-enters the subject by addressing a fictitious student in search of true philosophical insights, and – let us not forget – through this fictitious student also his entire audience:

Ἀλλὰ τούτων μὲν τις ὑπερορᾷ, φιλοσοφίαν δὲ ἀσπάζεται καὶ ἀλήθειαν τιμᾷ; Ἐνταῦθα ὑφαίρω τῆς μεγαλαυχίας, ὑφίεμαι, οὐχ ὁ αὐτός εἰμι· μέγα τὸ χρήμα καὶ δεόμενον προστάτου οὐ δημοτικοῦ, μὰ Δία, οὐδὲ ἐρχομένου χαμαί, οὐδὲ ἀνακεκραμένου τῷ τῶν πολλῶν τρόπῳ.

(Max. Or. 1.7)

But perhaps there is someone who despises all this, and is given over to love of philosophy and reverence for the truth instead. For him I furl the sails of my proud speech, and humble myself; I am not the same man. This is a weighty matter, God knows, and demands a champion out of the common run, not one who hugs the ground and is tainted with the ways of the crowd.

(Tr. M.B. Trapp)

Of course, Maximus does not declare here that he is not able to teach a student with honest philosophical aspirations. Rather, in a large stretch of sustained irony,<sup>36</sup>

<sup>32</sup> For the term 'subject-presumed-to-know' and further explanation, see the synthesis of A.W. Frank, 'Lecturing and transference: the undercover work of pedagogy', in Gallop (ed.), *Pedagogy* (n. 11), 28–35, who collects and comments on insights of E. Goffman, 'The lecture', in id., *Forms of Talk* (Oxford, 1981), 162–96 and R. Barthes, 'Ecrivains, intellectuels, professeurs', *Tel Quel* 47 (1971), 3–18. Note also that Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht* (n. 12), at 223 characterizes Maximus' entire oeuvre as 'autoritäre Texte'.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Goffman, 'The Lecture' (n. 32), at 189: 'Elegance of language – turns of phrase, metaphor, parallel structures, aphoristic formulations – can be taken as evidence not only of the speaker's intelligence ... but also of giving his mind and ability over to the job he is now performing.'

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Hobein, 'Zweck und Bedeutung' (n. 5), at 203: '... in die Philosophie sollen die νέοι eingeführt werden, und die philosophische Bildung, die ihnen durch die Vortragsreihe, die sie erwartet, vermittelt werden soll, wird die zukünftigen zünftigen Advokaten, Dichter, Staatsmänner unter den Hörern mit einem bessern Rüstzeug versehen, als es abgesehen von dem rein Technischen die Fachbildung vermag.' Cf. also Puiggalí, *Etude* (n. 1), at 59.

<sup>35</sup> The physical appearance was, indeed, also an important persuasive aspect of the speaker's performance. An interesting study on the semiotics of the (male) body and its importance for education in the Second Sophistic is M.W. Gleason, *Making Men. Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome* (Princeton, 1995).

<sup>36</sup> G. Anderson, *The Second Sophistic. A Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire* (London and New York, 1993), at 139.

Maximus the philosopher has to switch roles again, adapting himself to yet another situation, which requires a different form of discourse, that is the humble tone of the truth-loving philosopher.<sup>37</sup> Maximus is still orating, and thus logically continues speaking in his embellished style, but, through these swollen words, he must show his real philosophical person, his true sincerity, in order to convince his public that, besides being a gifted speaker, he also strives for authentic philosophical insights. In the following parts of the speech, it becomes clear that Maximus does not want his audience to have a one-sided image of him as a rhetorical virtuoso. He wants his audience to believe that, after he has removed that over-simplified mask, he is nothing but a true philosopher.

Therefore, Maximus needs to take a distinct position towards both contemporary philosophy and the philosophical tradition, which necessarily were the key constituents of the audience's conception of philosophy and its practitioners. In the eighth paragraph of the oration, Maximus vituperates what he decries as 'sophistic' education, the kind which depends too much on pedantic reasoning and conjuring with words, so that this system contains in fact more teachers than students.<sup>38</sup> The real philosopher, on the other hand, must 'rouse young men's souls and guide their ambitions' (*τὰς τῶν νέων ψυχὰς ξυνεπαίροντος, καὶ διαπαιδαγωγοῦντος αὐτῶν τὰς φιλοτιμίας* – tr. M.B. Trapp). The very same concept of *φιλοτιμία*, which was ardently encouraged by Maximus the orator in the fourth paragraph of his speech, has now become a possibly dangerous feature for young men, which must be tempered by the philosophical teacher. Contradictory though this might seem, the shift of attitude is, within Maximus' pragmatic concept of philosophy, perfectly comprehensible.<sup>39</sup>

There is, however, still an awkward element in Maximus' performance: the fact that his tone has shifted towards a more humble and sincere style does not mean that he has suddenly become another person. In front of the audience still stands the same man, who can be plausibly pictured as a wealthy aristocratic speaker, probably

<sup>37</sup> At this point in the oration, Maximus creates himself a kind of 'double' public, which has to evaluate both Maximus' rhetorical virtuosity in elaborating the subject and the sincerity of the subject itself (and, of course, of the philosopher who proclaims it). With this manoeuvre, Maximus resembles his sophistic contemporaries, who often performed *μέλειται* in front of their audiences. These are speeches held in the persona of an illustrious man of Greek history. During these performances, the sophists also created themselves a 'double' public, which, during these speeches, witnessed both the speaker's rhetorical skills and the impersonated historical figure, who adds authority to the speaker's utterances. Cf. T.A. Schmitz, 'Performing history in the Second Sophistic', in M. Zimmerman (ed.), *Geschichtsschreibung und politischer Wandel im 3. Jh. n. Chr.* (Stuttgart, 1999), 71–93 and R. Webb, 'Fiction, mimesis and the performance of the past in the Second Sophistic', in D. Konstan and S. Saïd (edd.), *Greeks on Greekness. Viewing the Greek Past under the Roman Empire* (Cambridge, 2006), 27–46, at 39.

<sup>38</sup> The 'sophists' Maximus talks about here do not seem to be the sophists we know from Philostratus' sophistic biographies. Maximus, engaging in a sort of zero-sum game, rather uses the term 'sophist', which from Plato on sometimes has an unphilosophical and therefore negative undertone in philosophical discourses, in order to downplay contemporary 'over-subtle' professional *philosophical* teachers, who, according to Maximus, did not spend enough time on really important issues (which, in this case, we might associate with ethics), but who paid too much attention to pedantic terminology, which might be associated with philosophical domains such as logic and physics. It is quite ironic that these fields are nowadays often regarded as more philosophical than plain ethics.

<sup>39</sup> Hobein, 'Zweck und Bedeutung' (n. 5), at 201–2, confronts this ideal of the philosophical orator with another excerpt from Maximus' *œuvre*, namely Max. Or. 25. 6b, and discovers a noteworthy resemblance between the thoughts in these two passages.

beautifully dressed, claiming to be incredibly successful and thus embodying the perfect example for his pupils *in spe*. The final two paragraphs (§ 9–10) of Maximus' speech bridge this suspicious gap between his wealthy appearance and the humble philosopher behind the facade.

In the ninth paragraph, Maximus explicitly attacks the widespread (mis)understanding that old age, poverty and obscurity are the features of the good philosopher. To prove his point, he invokes the authority of Socrates, the archetypal image of what a philosopher should embody. Maximus argues that Socrates also cared for the rich citizens, who, because of their political interest, also have the moral obligation to pay attention to philosophy while deliberating about important matters for the *polis* – which was, unfortunately enough, not the case with Alcibiades, Critias and others, who caused several catastrophes for the people of Athens. Maximus thus implicitly highlights the social and political relevance of philosophy and urges his audience not to make the same mistake in rejecting philosophy, philosophical teaching and a philosophical teacher (like Maximus himself) if they want to succeed in life. The narcissistic teacher demands that his pupils attain the same wealthy and responsible status as he has attained himself.

Furthermore, Aristippus' rich appearance adds weight to Maximus' statement about the possible coexistence of wealth and philosophy. This brings our wealthy philosophical orator to the following, self-apologizing statement at the beginning of the last paragraph:

Ἐξεταστέον δὴ τὸν φιλόσοφον οὐ σχήματι, οὐχ ἡλικίᾳ, οὐ τύχῃ, ἀλλὰ γνώμῃ, καὶ λόγῳ, καὶ παρασκευῇ ψυχῆς, ὅφ' ὧν μόνων χειροτονεῖται φιλόσοφος. (Max. Or. 1.10)

The philosopher must be judged not by appearance, nor by age, nor by social status, but by his mind and his words and the disposition of his soul; for these are the only things that make a man a philosopher. (Tr. M.B. Trapp)

This utterance is connected to the closing section of the speech, in which Maximus takes up the same dramatic imagery as in the beginning of his oration. There is, however, a slight difference in meaning here: the philosophers who are mentioned here are no longer the protean *actors* in the drama of everyday life, but seem to have become the unchanging *roles*, each with its own guise, performed by a coherent philosophical wisdom, a wisdom which Maximus claims to be his as well. Maximus' message cannot be misinterpreted: his rich appearance is only a guise behind which a wonderful philosophical splendour may be found, just as one can find it in Pythagoras, Socrates, Xenophon and many others. Consequently, Maximus must be situated in the Greek philosophical tradition, which confers on him the authority to speak as a philosopher *pur sang*. Maximus thus manages to present himself as an insider both to the world of his audience and to the philosophical tradition on behalf of which he speaks.<sup>40</sup>

In the enthusiastic last sentences, the dynamics of this double insider position are brought to a head:

Ὡ μακάριοι μὲν τῶν δραμάτων οἱ ὑποκριταί, μακάριοι δὲ τῶν ἀκουσμάτων οἱ θεαταί. Τίς ἂν ἡμῖν καὶ νῦν ὑποκριτῆς καὶ ἀγωνιστῆς γένοιτο οὐκ ἀσχήμων, οὐδὲ ἄφρωνος, ἀλλ' ὀμιλεῖν ἀξιόχρεως θεάτροις Ἑλληνικοῖς; Ζητώμεν τὸν ἄνδρα· τάχα πού φανήσεται, καὶ φανείς οὐκ ἀτιμασθήσεται. (Max. Or. 1.10)

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Trapp, *Philosophy in the Roman Empire* (n. 13), at 26.

Happy the actors of the dramas, happy the spectators who beheld them! Might there be for us, even now, an actor and a performer, worthy through his grace and eloquence to play to the theatres of Hellas? Let us search for this man. Perhaps he may somewhere come to light, and if he does, he will not go without honour.

(Tr. M.B. Trapp, with modifications)

In this grand finale, Maximus brilliantly combines the two poses he wants to reconcile throughout the whole speech, which are self-assured performance and philosophical credibility. Leaning for the last time on the 'philosopher is actor' metaphor, he articulates the pupils' demand for a decent teacher, who has the right to speak to them about major philosophical issues. Maximus does not formulate the obvious answer that *he* is in fact the one they are looking for, but leaves his audience with mere suggestion. There are, I believe, three important rhetorical motivations for this. Firstly, it is obvious that rhetorical innuendo is very often more powerful than a plain utterance. Secondly, Maximus sticks to his philosophical sincerity, which does not allow him to boast of his philosophical knowledge. And thirdly, he wants to identify himself with his audience, in order to speak as a radical insider, one who might sit equally well among his public, one who knows what his pupils desire, and one who can guarantee to fulfil their intellectual and practical needs.<sup>41</sup> The latter aspect appears very clearly from Maximus' use of the first person plural in the last sentence (*ζητῶμεν*), by which he rhetorically equalizes himself to the world of his public. But, even then, Maximus the speaker still owns the stage, is still the 'subject-presumed-to-know', is still authorized with his institutional power, and still has a huge influence on the thoughts of his listeners. Driven by this tension, questioner and answer fuse into one single person, Maximus of Tyre, who becomes thereby an amalgam of both a sincere teacher and an insider to the audience's beliefs and needs, both a convincing philosopher and a powerful rhetorician.

This analysis has brought to light that Maximus, leaning on imagery from theatre, music and athletics but nevertheless always putting first and foremost his own philosophical paradigm, makes use of his personal appearance, in which both his rhetorical and philosophical strength are incorporated, and advertises his own person as a living example for his audience. He seeks to occupy an inside position both to the world of his public and to the philosophical tradition in order to promote himself as the ideal teacher in philosophy.

### III

After this textual analysis, some words are needed about the value of the results so far obtained. For my rhetorical analysis strongly focussed on the 'performative'<sup>42</sup> character of Maximus' text. This implies that, during the reading process, I did not want to detect Maximus' (either consciously or subconsciously) 'hidden' personal assumptions about philosophy, rhetoric and so on; I rather wanted to reconstruct the intended effect on the audience as Maximus' significant response to his (precarious) position as a philosophical teacher in the dynamic context of the Second Sophistic, where philosophy had a very ambiguous status, as it both constituted (a part of) the elite's cultural identity and served a 'higher', more philosophical goal, apart from political and social life. I hope to have demonstrated how Maximus the philosopher 'played his part' in this contemporary drama of life. Since there is no single account of Maximus' actual reception by his contemporaries, however, the only (but none the

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Trapp, 'Philosophical Sermons' (n. 3), at 1952: '... accessibility is as important to the persona as authority.'

less very useful) data for this intended effect can be found in the text, as I hope to have shown above. By thus reconciling a reader-response approach with authorial intention in a wider historical framework, my aim was to reconstruct the ‘monological dialogue’ between Maximus the orator and his public of listeners, each shaped and to a certain extent determined by their more or less shared cultural climate.

Some objections, however, can be made against this approach, for there seem (but, to my mind, only seem) to be some difficulties in applying such a pragmatic reading to Maximus, whose performances are supported by only very little knowledge about his biographical background (the contemporary context in a narrower sense). To disarm these offhand remarks, some comment on what we do know about Maximus’ life and what we might assume about it seems appropriate here with regards to a justification of my way of reading. The basic argument defended here is that we know enough of Maximus’ *dialexeis* and the (contemporary) context to approach this text as a performative text, just as we have done above in the analytical part of this study.

Firstly, one can of course wonder whether the highly self-confident provocations in Maximus’ first oration are rooted in the author’s actual fame in his milieu, or whether his great reputation was a pure rhetorical construct, at risk of being unmasked by his audience. Maximus must have been either a highly reputed master – which is, to my mind, the more plausible option – or a very audacious charlatan. Since there are no data available about his contemporary reputation, we can get no certainty about this dilemma, but we should not be too worried about this while interpreting the central message Maximus wants to get across, for the text itself clearly indicates the author’s intentions towards his audience, apart from the eventual result.

Secondly, we cannot even know for sure if Maximus actually brought his rhetorical speeches on stage.<sup>43</sup> It is in fact possible that he simply wrote down his orations in order to let them circulate among students of philosophy. But this supposition should not bother us that much either, for even if Maximus had only composed his speeches on paper, the reader of the text, who is the one to give meaning to what Maximus has written, cannot but mentally realize this first *dialexis* within the context of a spoken performance by its author.<sup>44</sup> Therefore, we can quite easily assume that Maximus ‘enacted’ his speeches, and yet not be troubled by the fact that he possibly did not.

The same reasoning process can be applied to Maximus’ audience, the place of performance and the occasion on which Maximus presented his speech to the public.

<sup>42</sup> The idea that speech is ‘performative’ displays some correspondence with modern speech-act theory, as it is described in J.L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, ed. J.O. Urmson (Oxford, 1963<sup>2</sup>). Note, however, that my literary application of speech-act theory goes far beyond Austin’s ideas, which are mostly limited to the analysis of individual sentences.

<sup>43</sup> Closely linked to this problem is also the question to what extent Maximus’ orations were *αὐτοσχεδιάσματα*. Until the beginning of the previous century, there was a sort of *communis opinio* that they were actually off the cuff (see e.g. K. Dürr, *Sprachliche Untersuchungen zu den Dialexeis des Maximus von Tyrus* [Leipzig, 1899], at 7, and Hobein, *Maximi Tyrii philosophoumena* [n. 1], at 22–4) but this view has in more recent times been challenged (see e.g. Koniaris, ‘Zetemata (I)’ [n. 1], at 111–13, esp. 113: ‘What seems in [the *Διαλέξεις*] impromptu may thus be only an artistic imitation of the truly impromptu’). In this case, we can limit ourselves to the opinion that, whether this first speech was improvised or not, it is very likely that Maximus will have made at least some preparations to make sure that his crucial introductory speech was convincing for his audience.

<sup>44</sup> This is due to the many references in the text, as is shown above, which require the physical presence of the speaker in front of his audience. Cf. e.g. § 7: ‘Behold, young men, this treasury of eloquence ... that stands before you ...’ (Tr. M.B. Trapp).

The most reliable hypothesis about these data – attested in the *Suda*<sup>45</sup> as well as in some manuscripts<sup>46</sup> – is that Maximus publicly delivered his speeches in Rome in the second century A.D. before a young audience. Unfortunately enough, the general tone of the text does not offer any indication that Rome was indeed the place – let alone the only place – where Maximus introduced himself by this *dialexis*. But, yet again, it matters little where exactly the orations took place, for the performed message is clear enough: Maximus wants to offer his Greek philosophical education to a non-educated, either Greek or non-Greek, audience.

Some other features of this audience can be extracted from the speeches themselves, for example from Maximus' addressing the audience as *νέοι* in *Or.* 1.7. As Hobein has convincingly indicated, Maximus must have had an adolescent public situated in the higher classes of 'Roman' society.<sup>47</sup> This does not necessarily mean that there was no place for older men among Maximus' spectators. There could, for example, well have been fathers who came to watch Maximus' performance in order to determine whether the speaker was worthy to teach their beloved sons. All we can say is that these older people are not the direct addressees of Maximus' speech. If they are spoken to, it is only through a discourse directed to others than them. To use Umberto Eco's terminology, the 'model readers', that is the ones with whom the author wants to communicate through his text in the first place, are Maximus' potential students of philosophy.<sup>48</sup> This 'model readership' presupposes that the author's intellectual background and level are the same as that of the readers.<sup>49</sup> For Maximus, this implies that he has lowered his level to make sure that he will be understood by his pupils, but also that he has maintained certain prevalence over his students in order to raise their intellectual standard, which is displayed in the whole corpus of the *dialexeis*.<sup>50</sup> In any case, for a pragmatic textual analysis, it will largely suffice to estimate the effect Maximus' utterances had on this non-educated (part of the) audience. After all, they are the ones who had to be convinced by Maximus' person, speech and pedagogical project.

#### IV

To conclude, then, I would like to summarize the conclusions and implications more generally:

(1) Even though we are not certain about Maximus' actual impact on his audience, we can by means of a pragmatic approach to his first *dialexis* give ourselves account of his actual rhetorical efforts to attract students in philosophy.

(2) Related to this observation, I hope to have shown how Maximus justifies and resolves his own paradoxical position between rhetoric and philosophy, by ascribing

<sup>45</sup> *Μάξιμος, Τύριος, φιλόσοφος, διέτριψε δὲ ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἐπὶ Κομόδου.*

<sup>46</sup> See n. 1 for bibliography on the manuscript tradition.

<sup>47</sup> Hobein, 'Zweck und Bedeutung' (n. 5), at 206–7, where he also describes Maximus' philosophy as a *Philosophie des Salons* for the Roman upper class, by which they entertained themselves, for instance during their banquets.

<sup>48</sup> See most clearly Koniaris, 'Zetemata (I)' (n. 1), at 113–14 and Trapp, *Maximus of Tyre* (n. 7), at xx–xxii.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. U. Eco, *The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts* (Bloomington, 1984), at 7: 'The author has to assume that the ensemble of codes he relies upon is the same as that shared by his possible reader.'

<sup>50</sup> This is an aspect defined by Trapp, *Maximus of Tyre* (n. 7), at xvi–xx, on Maximus' 'philosophy made easy'.



to the philosopher an all-compassing impact on everyday life, which contains rhetoric as well. In the rhetorical progression of the speech, Maximus' 'sincere' philosophical inclinations thus become the very justification of his rhetorical virtuosity, and his rhetorical virtuosity becomes a pledge for his philosophical greatness. If we accept the hypothesis that this speech was in fact Maximus' introductory speech, we can extend this mutual justification of philosophy and rhetoric to the whole of Maximus' corpus, assuming that Maximus' rhetorical style is also one of the key constituents of his philosophical authority. Besides, the fact that his concept of narcissistic teaching is very closely interwoven with plain imitation of the teacher (in contrast to other philosophers of his age) illustrates that his philosophical education strongly resembles the contemporary rhetorical practices which must have been very familiar to his audience.

(3) In order to understand Maximus' first *dialexis* in an adequate way, one needs to take the author's pedagogical ambitions fully into account. Only if we pay attention to the specificity of his not fully educated model audience, can we grasp Maximus' rhetorical devices in an entirely appropriate context. In this contribution, I have tried to prove the advantages of such an approach by introducing the concept of pedagogical narcissism into my analysis, in order to expose which issues are at stake in Maximus' orations and what the author's solutions to them are. In the end, it seems to me that, by taking advantage of the narcissistic aspect of his teaching, Maximus represents not only the ideal teacher in philosophy, but also the living example which every student of his should imitate. This pedagogical narcissism, which is often feared today, becomes in Maximus' hands a powerful rhetorical weapon.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> I would like to thank Prof. Geert Roskam, Prof. Luc Van der Stockt and Prof. Michael Trapp for their useful comments and suggestions on this paper.